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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
policy. 20° By contrast, the notice of defect is an essential ingredient in
establishing negligence on the part of the municipality. 207 Since the vil-
lage may be deemed culpable only after the notice of defect has been
received and a reasonable time to repair has elapsed, where no notice is
given, it cannot become a tortfeasor. 20 8 As such, the rule of Dole,
permitting an apportionment of damages among joint tortfeasors, can-
not apply.
The Supreme Court, Erie County, has struck the chord which
distinguishes the notice of claim and the notice of defect. While both
are conditions precedent, the latter is a key element in defining action-
able negligence. Consequently, no liability may rest on the village, be it
through a Dole apportionment or otherwise, absent compliance with
the notice of defect requirements.
Collection of Judgments
CPLR 1007 basically provides for the right to indemnification by
way of impleader.211 In Adams v. Lindsay,210 the Supreme Court, Mon-
206 N.Y. GEN. MuNic. LAw § 50-e (McKinney 1965) allows for an extension of time
where unyielding insistence on compliance with the ninety-day period would work hard-
ship. The statute provides, in relevant part:
5. The court, in its discretion, may grant leave to serve a notice of claim within
a reasonable time after the expiration of the time specified in subdivision one
of this section in the following cases: (1) Where the claimant is an infant, or is
mentally or physically incapacitated, and by reason of such disability fails to serve
a notice of claim within the time specified; (2) where a person entitled to make a
claim dies before the expiration of the time limited for service of the notice;
or (3) where the claimant fails to serve a notice of claim within the time limited
for service of the notice by reason of his justifiable reliance upon settlement
representations made in writing by an authorized representative of the party
against which the claim is made or of its insurance carrier.
Furthermore, compliance with the notice of claim requirements of § 50-e are unnecessary
in actions brought in equity. Fontana v. Town of Hempstead, 18 App. Div. 2d 1084, 239
N.Y.S.2d 512, 513 (2d Dep't 1963) (mem.). Additionally, courts have been willing to find
a waiver of this condition where a municipality, through its own intransigence, has in-
duced a plaintiff to rely on the sufficiency of an improperly drafted notice of claim until
the ninety-day period has expired. Teresta v. City of New York, 304 N.Y. 440, 443, 108
N.E.2d 397, 398 (1952). See also Chikara v. City of New York, 21 Misc. 2d 446, 190
N.Y.S.2d 576 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 10 App. Div. 2d 862,
199 N.Y.S.2d 829 (2d Dep't 1960) (mem.).
See generally Note, Notice of Claim in Negligence Actions, 22 BKLYN. L. Rnv. 342
(1956); Note, Late Filing of Claim Against City Where Claimant is Incapacitated, 7
SYRAcsE L. REv. 337 (1956); Note, Renewed Recommendations for Revision of Section
50-e of General Municipal Law, 24 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 318 (1950).
20776 Misc. 2d at 319, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
208 See King v. Incorporated Village of Lynbrook, 35 Misc. 2d 75, 229 N.Y.S.2d 840
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1962).
209 713 McKiNEY's CPLR 1007, commentary at 333 (1963); see WK&M 1007.01. The
practice of impleader furnishes the means for a determination of primary and ultimate
responsibility in one proceeding, thus avoiding a multiplicity of actions. H. WACEL,
Nav YoRK PCrICnE UNDER un CPLR 94 (4th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as WACHT=L].
For a discussion of the development of indemnity in New York, see Note, Dole v. Dow
Chemical Co.: A Revolution in New York Law, 47 ST. JoHN's L. Rv. 185, 189-200 (1972).
21077 Misc. 2d 824, 354 N.YS.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1974). For a concise
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roe County, considered the question of when a third-party judgment,
based on a Dole apportionment, could be collected from the third-party
defendant. The problem presented to the court in Adams was twofold:
first, whether payment of the third-party judgment is conditional upon
full satisfaction of the principal judgment; and second, in the event of
partial payment of the principal judgment, whether the third-party
plaintiff is entitled to collect from the third-party defendant the latter's
proportionate liability for any amount paid.
In Adams, plaintiff sued the driver of an automobile for personal
injuries arising from an accident. Pursuant to CPLR 1007,211 the de-
fendant brought a third-party action against the driver of another
automobile, claiming that the second driver was partially responsible
for plaintiff's injuries. The two actions were consolidated, with judg-
ments entered on jury verdicts rendered for the plaintiff in the princi-
pal action and for the third-party plaintiff in the third-party action.
Applying Dole, the jury determined the relative fault of the third-party
plaintiff to be 70 percent and that of the third-party defendant to be 30
percent. Controversy arose when the third-party plaintiff sought to
enforce his claim in full before he had satisfied the main judgment.
On a motion to amend the third-party judgment, the court held
that the judgment entered must be revised, with provision inserted that
it need not be fully settled until the principal plaintiff receives full
satisfaction from the third-party plaintiff. Of greater significance, how-
ever, the court ruled that in the event of partial payment to the plain-
tiff, the third-party plaintiff could enforce his judgment only to the
extent that the portion he paid exceeded his apportioned liability.212
In requiring full satisfaction of the principal judgment as a condi-
tion precedent to a demand for total payment of the third-party judg-
ment, the Adams court followed well-settled principles regarding in-
demnity claims. A cause of action for indemnity does not accrue at the
time of commission of the tort, but rather, at the time the party seeking
indemnification actually pays the principal judgment. 213 Nevertheless,
discussion of the Adams case, see McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 171 N.Y.L.J. 115,
June 14, 1974, at 4, col. 3.
211 CPLR 1007 reads in pertinent part:
After the service of his answer, a defendant may proceed against a person not
a party who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim
against him, by serving upon such person a summons and third-party complaint
and all prior pleadings in the action.
21277 Misc. 2d at 826-27, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 358-59.
218 See, e.g., Emil v. James Felt & Co., 45 App. Div. 2d 677, 356 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1st
Dep't 1974); Jenkins v. L.F. Elec. Installations Corp., 168 N.Y.L.J. 3, July 6, 1972, at 2,
col. 4 (App. T. 1st Dep't); 3 WK&M I 3019.48. This was also the practice under § 193-a(l)
of the CPA. See Musco v. Conte, 22 App. Div. 2d 121, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589 (2d Dep't 1964);
Satta v. City of New York, 272 App. Div. 782, 69 N.Y.S.2d 653 (2d Dep't 1947).
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to avoid a multiplicity of suits,214 CPLR 1007 has been held to encom-
pass contingent claims of indemnification. 215 As a result, the party seek-
ing indemnity may obtain a conditional third-party judgment in the
main action.216 The potential liability of the third-party defendant is
thereby fixed, with payments to be made when the indemnitee sustains
an actual loss, viz., payment of the judgment in the principal action.217
A right to indemnification, however, may accrue to a third-party
plaintiff before he completely satisfies the judgment against him. Thus,
the defendant in Adams was permitted to enforce his Dole claim after,
and to the extent to which, he paid in excess of 70 percent of the main
judgment. In resolving the partial payment issue, the Adams court
followed the essential spirit of Dole. There, the Court of Appeals held
that whenever a third party has been determined to be partially liable
for the "negligence for which a defendant is cast in damages, the re-
sponsibility for that part is recoverable by the prime defendant against
the third-party."218 The court in Adams reasoned that the third-party
Professor M. E. Occhialino has suggested that, as a result of Dole, the date of accrual
for the indemnity claim should be established when the action is first brought against the
defendant. He contends that at this time the defendant is cognizant of his right to insti-
tute a Dole claim. Accordingly, the determination of apportioned liability would be
simplified, and court backlogs would be cut, inasmuch as the defendant would be
encouraged to bring together all potentially liable parties in a single lawsuit. Contribution,
in NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT oF THE N.Y. JuDICIAL CONFERENCE 217, 231 (1974).
214 See note 209 supra. In actual practice, the impleader action is brought before the
statute of limitations has begun. See Lutz Feed Co. v. Audet & Co., 72 Misc. 2d 28, 337
N.Y.S.2d 852 (Sup. Ct. Delaware County 1972); 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, supp. com-
mentary at 229 (1972).
215 See Krause v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 22 N.Y.2d 147, 239 N.E.2d 175,
292 N.YS.2d 67 (1968).
216 See McCabe v. Queensboro Farm Prods., Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 204, 239 N.E.2d 340, 292
N.Y.S.2d 400 (1968); 125 West 45th St. Restaurant Corp. v. Frama Realty Corp., 249 App.
Div. 589, 293 N.Y.S. 216 (Ist Dep't 1937); First Nat'l Bank v. Bankers' Trust, 151 Misc.
23, 271 N.Y.S. 191 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1934); 3 CARmOD-WArr 2d § 19:130, at 405
(1968).
217 The Court in McCabe v. Queensboro Farm Prods., Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 204, 239 N.E.2d
840, 292 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1968), recognized that the third-party judgment could be executed
only when the third-party plaintiff had satisfied the principal judgment. As a result, it was
felt that the allowance of a conditional judgment "conveys no greater rights than could
be obtained if the action were brought independently." Id. at 208, 239 N.E.2d at 342, 292
N.Y.S.2d at 403.
In several areas of contract indemnification, the collection of the third-party judg-
ment may be allowed prior to payment of the principal judgment. For example, when an
insured becomes liable for an excess judgment, actual payment is not a condition precedent
to the insurer's obligation to pay. See Henegan v. Merchants Mutual Ins. Co., 31 App.
Div. 2d 12, 294 N.Y.S.2d 547 (ist Dep't 1968). Other exceptions to the traditional require-
ment of satisfaction of the underlying judgment generally relate to absolute obligations
and not to instances of indemnification against loss. See Rector v. Higgins, 48 N.Y. 532
(1872) (lessee covenanted to pay lessor's taxes on realty); Doyle v. New York City Transit
Authority, 9 App. Div. 2d 903, 195 N.Y.S.2d 331 (2d Dep't 1959) (contract expressly pro-
vided for indemnification against liability, not loss).
218 Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 80 N.Y.2d 143, 148-49, 282 N..2d 288, 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d
882, 387 (1972) (emphasis added).
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plaintiff cannot be "cast in damages" until he pays to the plaintiff an
amount in excess of that part of the principal judgment for which he is
proportionally liable.219 Consequently, it is only after the third-party
plaintiff pays more than his share that it can be said the third-party
defendant is obligated to indemnify.
The court found further justification for its conclusion in an
analysis of former CPLR 1401.220 An essential condition in procuring a
judgment for contribution had been that one joint tortfeasor pay more
than his pro rata share.221 The Adams court concluded that this excess
payment theory, underlying CPLR 1401, was equally applicable to in-
demnification under Dole. Although the Adams decision only tangen-
tially examined the appropriateness of Dole in a contribution setting,222
the court nonetheless concluded that the form of a judgment for partial
219 77 Misc. 2d at 827, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 359; see 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, supp.
commentary at 232 (1972).
22077 Misc. 2d at 827, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 360. CPLR 1401 is in derogation of the
common law, which did not recognize a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors.
However, the plaintiff may still recover all of his damages from any one of the de-
fendants. See Jones v. All Boro Car Leasing, Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 567, 325 N.Y.S.2d 535 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. Kings County 1971).
Recently, the Legislature amended article 14 of the CPLR, incorporating the Dole
apportionment theory into the contribution rules. 1 N.Y. Sass. LAws [1974], ch. 742, § 1
(McKinney). Contribution is now regarded as a claim for an apportionment of liability.
For a discussion of the new article 14, see text accompanying notes 66-81 supra.
221 At the time of the Adams decision, CPLR 1401 provided in part:
Where a money judgment has been recovered jointly against defendants in an
action for a personal injury or for property damage, each defendant who has
paid more than his pro rata share shall be entitled to contribution from the other
defendants with respect to the excess paid over and above his pro rata share;
provided, however, that no defendant shall be compelled to pay to any other
such defendant an amount greater than his own pro rata share of the entire
judgment.
See Epstein v. National Transp. Co., 287 N.Y. 456, 40 N.E.2d 632 (1942); Fox v. Western
New York Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N.Y. 305, 178 N.E. 289 (1931); WACHTrLL, supra note 209,
at 100; 3 WK&M 1401.01.
As amended, CPLR 1401 permits a contribution claim among joint tortfeasors even
when the parties subject to liability are not joined in the action. Accordingly, the require-
ment of a joint judgment has been eliminated. TwELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JuDICiAL
CONFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THE CPLR, as appearing in 2 N.Y. Sm. LAws [1974].
comment (f), at 1809-10 (McKinney) [hereinafter cited as TwELFrH REPORT]. Nevertheless,
the tortfeasor's payment of more than his equitable (apportioned) share is still a pre-
requisite to an award of contribution. See note 223 and accompanying text infra.
222 In Dole, the court considered its new rule as "in effect a partial indemnification."
30 N.Y.2d at 147, 282 N.E.2d at 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 386. Yet, in Kelly v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972), the rule of apportion-
ment was also referred to as a "refinement of the rule of contribution." Id. at 39, 286
N.E.2d at 243, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 855. In fact, the basic premise of the new article codifying
the doctrine of apportioned liability is that Dole "should be viewed as modifying the
doctrine of contribution in New York, rather than as completely revamping the law of
indemnity." TwELFTH REPORT, supra note 221, comment (e), at 1808. Nevertheless, pro
rata contribution ostensibly remains in instances where co-tortfeasors have been joined
as parties defendant.
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contribution and indemnity should be the same. This understanding is
substantially consistent with the subsequently amended CPLR 1402,
which precludes the enforcement of a Dole claim for contribution until
the party has paid more than his apportioned share of liability.223 Ac-
cordingly, Adams is not at all incongruous with the practicalities and
fairness embodied in the recent modification of section 1402.
Intrafamily Torts
In Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, Inc.224 and Ryan v. Fahey,2 2 5
the Second and Fourth Departments of the Appellate Division en-
dorsed a recent Third Department decision, Holodook v. Spencer,226
concerning intrafamily torts. Considering the question of whether a
parent owes a legal duty of supervision to his child, with a cause of
action accruing to the injured child upon a breach of such duty, both
courts answered in the negative. In light of Dole, the conclusion that
such a claim is impermissible is of particular importance. 227
223 CPLR 1402, as amended, reads as follows:
Amount of contribution. The amount of contribution to which a person is entitled
shall be the excess paid by him over and above his equitable share of the judg-
ment recovered by the injured party; but no person shall be required to contribute
an amount greater than his equitable share. The equitable share shall be deter-
mined in accordance with the relative culpability of each person liable for
contribution.
I N.Y. SEss. LAWs [1974], ch. 742, § 1 (McKinney) (emphasis added). Prior to the enact-
ment of article 14, the Supreme Court, Kings County, in Mazelis v. Wallerstein, 77 Misc.
2d 335, 353 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1974), held that to the extent one of the
defendants pays more than his apportioned share of liability, he may bring an action for
contribution. Id. at 340, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
224 44 App. Div. 2d 127, 355 N.Y.S.2d 432 (2d Dep't 1974).
225 43 App. Div. 2d 429, 352 N.Y.S.2d 283 (4th Dep't 1974).
226 43 App. Div. 2d 129, 350 N.Y.S.2d 199 (3d Dep't 1973), discussed in The Survey,
48 ST. JoHN's L. RIv. 611, 650 (1974). In Holodook, a four-year-old infant, while running
between parked cars, was struck by the defendant's automobile. The Supreme Court,
Columbia County, denied a motion to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim against the
infant's father and a third-party action against the infant's mother, both of which in-
volved requests for Dole apportionments. 73 Misc. 2d 181, 340 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct.
Columbia County 1973). With one judge dissenting, the Appellate Division, Third Depart-
ment, reversed, holding the Dole claims to be legally insufficient. 43 App. Div. 2d at 137,
350 N.Y.S.2d at 206.
In a companion case, Graney v. Graney, 43 App. Div. 2d 207, 350 N.Y.S.2d 207 (3d
Dep't 1973), the Third Department affirmed a trial court order dismissing a direct child-
parent suit based upon a claim of negligent supervision.
227Where negligent supervision of an infant is alleged, the claimant is essentially
arguing that the parent had failed to supervise and protect the injured infant, thereby
contributing to his injury. The existence of such a theory has been the subject of a great
deal of judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Sorrentino v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) (claim allowed); Northrop v. Hogstyn, 75 Misc. 2d 486, 348 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct.
Ontario County 1973) (claim disallowed); Searles v. Dardani, 75 Misc. 2d 279, 347 N.Y.S.2d
662 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1973) (claim allowed). See generally Dachs, Seider v. Roth
Upstaged by Dole v. Dow Chemical, 169 N.Y.L.J. 22, Jan. 31, 1973, at 1, col. 5; McLaughlin,
New York Trial Practice, 169 N.Y.L.J. 92, May 11, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
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